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I. Introduction 
Throughout the latter part of the twentieth century the United States of America 
has experienced an incredible boom in the rate of incarceration of its citizens. This 
increase arguably began in the 1960’s when the Nixon administration oversaw the 
beginning of the war on drugs in America. The U.S. now has one of the highest rates of 
incarceration amongst industrialized nations. The increase in incarceration has not 
impacted all groups of society equally. Citizens who have been incarcerated on drug 
charges have disproportionately been African American or other racial minorities, even 
though many studies have concluded that drug use is fairly equal amongst racial groups. 
In order to remedy this situation it is essential to first understand what causes and has 
caused rising incarceration rates. 
In this research I explore gubernatorial rhetoric as a potential explanation for the 
epidemic of mass incarceration in the United States. Using SAS® Enterprise Content 
Categorization, SAS® Text Miner, and SAS® Contextual Analysis I gathered data from 
the state of the state speeches of governors from all 50 states. I find that gubernatorial 
rhetoric that is tough on crime corresponds strongly and consistently to an increase in the 
incarceration rate in the states. 
The political phenomenon that I am trying to understand is how state government 
employees are affected by the tone that the chief executive of a state uses when 
discussing crime, and whether the actions of these state employees subsequently lead to 
higher rates of incarceration. The governor is the top government official in charge of 
employees of a state, so when this official addresses the state the employees may take the 
governor’s message as an order for how they should do their jobs. While many political 
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factors may affect legislation and its enforcement, a governor has the ability to set the 
tone of a state when it comes to policy issues such as crime. 
 
II. Literature Review 
In this study I examine the language that the governor of a state uses at the annual 
(or biennial)  state of the state address to see if there is a relationship between crime 
rhetoric and the subsequent rate of incarceration in that state. My theory is that 
government employees with the power to make arrests and impact how long an inmate 
remains incarcerated are influenced by the governor’s message. 
 To demonstrate the increase in incarceration rates throughout the past several 
decades, I turn to Bruce Western’s book “Punishment and Inequality in America” (2006). 
Western examines incarceration rates in inmates per 100,000 adults in the population 
from 1925 to 2003. He finds that the rate of incarceration in America was quite steady 
from 1925 to 1975 (50 years) at around 0.1%. Beginning in 1975, the rate of incarcerated 
adults rapidly increased, and by 2003 the incarceration rate was roughly 0.7%. While a 
number smaller than 1% may seem small, it is anything but insignificant. The change in 
those numbers means that from 1975 to 2003 (28 years) the rate of incarcerated adults 
grew to be seven times what it was in 1975. To put the United States in context with 
other developed nations, Western compares US incarceration rates with countries in 
Western Europe. In 2001, the US incarceration rate was 686 people per 100,000 adults, 
and the United Kingdom, which had the highest incarceration rate of any Western 
European country, experienced an incarceration rate of 126 people per 100,000 adults. 
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Western’s numbers are calculated using the rate of incarceration, which negates the 
potential impact of an increase in population size.  
Michael Tonry (1999) endeavored to understand why incarceration rates have 
increased so dramatically in the United States since the mid-late twentieth century. Tonry 
examines several potential factors; increased crime rates, public opinion on drugs, 
increased partisanship in politics, crime as a wedge issue, and a cyclical increase in crime 
which follows history. He concludes that there has not been a substantial increase in 
crime. Rather it follows historical patterns and public policy is slow to catch up to the 
incidence of crime. For example, Tonry argues that the strictest prosecution and policing 
of the war on drugs began after drug use started to decline. Tonry claims that Americans 
have fallen into Musto’s paradigm- they are not concerned with the effectiveness of anti-
drug policies, rather they are most concerned with denouncing drug use. A consequence 
of Musto’s paradigm is the epidemic of mass incarceration. Michael Tonry’s research 
attempts to understand why incarceration rates have been increasing in America, and his 
conclusion that crime rates have not been a factor further provides more context for my 
research which examines potential causes for incarceration rates in America. 
Another potential explanation for the increased incarceration rates is a change in 
the demographics of the population of the United States. In his book, Franklin Zimring 
(2007) evaluates the “Usual Suspects: Imprisonment, Demography, and the Economy,” 
which are three well-known potential causes of incarceration-rate increases in a country. 
The two age groups which are considered to be at the highest risk for committing crimes 
are 15-24 years old and 15-29 years old.  Zimring examines the shifting age 
demographics of the United States from 1980 to 2000, and finds that both age groups (15-
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24 and 15-29) experienced substantial decreases during the 20 year period. The 15-24 
group declined in magnitude by 26% and the 15-29 group declined by 24%. Zimring 
explains that the smaller shares of the population in the high-risk age groups actually 
pushed crime rates downward; this affected violent crime only by “a few percent,” but 
this affected property crime rates by as much as 6%. Even though at the time reports by 
criminologists such as DiIulio (1996) expected a massive increase in “juvenile super-
predators,” the exact opposite turned out to be true, as age demographics instead pushed 
crime rates downwards. 
An increase in drug arrests is often cited as a cause of mass incarceration, 
particularly since President Nixon officially declared a war on drugs in 1971. In their 
research, Useem and Piehl (2008) demonstrate that the proportion of inmates imprisoned 
due to drug charges grew from 6% in 1980 to 21% in 2003.  During that period of 23 
years, the proportion of drug offenders grew to 3.5 times of what it was in 1980. The 
implementation of the war on drugs began with the chief executive of the United States, 
and I argue that it has been carried out at the state level by governors, the chief executives 
of the states. Since I include rhetoric about crime and drugs in my analysis, the Useem 
and Piehl study (2008) provides context for my hypothesis that gubernatorial rhetoric 
regarding crime corresponds to incarceration rates. 
Gubernatorial rhetoric has not been a focus for much research concerned with 
determining the potential cause of increased incarceration rates. However, Unah and 
Coggins (2013) have conducted a study which examines the potential cause of increased 
incarceration rates which have persisted in the US for several decades (Unah 2013). Unah 
and Coggins test eight hypotheses attempting to explain the boom in incarceration and 
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find that gubernatorial rhetoric during the annual State of the state address has the most 
significant impact. My research expands upon the theory set forth by Unah and Coggins, 
in that the data that they used only covered content analysis from State of the state 
addresses from each state during the period of 2001 to 2004. Given the relationship that 
they discovered in their research, I will expand upon their findings and test their 
hypothesis during the years 2001 through 2013 to understand whether this is a sustainable 
theory.  
Moreover, Unah and Coggins (2013) assumed that when the governor speaks, 
employees are listening. I move beyond that assumption to test via survey methods 
whether relevant state employees are listening to the state of the state speeches. 
In order to claim that gubernatorial rhetoric affects incarceration rates, it is 
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that power. Ferguson (2003) examines the role that the chief executive, the governor of 
each state, plays in the legislative process. She examines the personal factors of the chief 
executive, institutional factors such as how much power they have in relation to other 
branches of government, political factors such as partisanship in government, and the 
condition of the economy as potential models of gubernatorial success. Ferguson finds 
that the factors which have the most impact on the efficacy of the chief executive are 
those over which they have little control such as political climate, institutional dynamics 
and the state of the economy. If I find that all of those are not in support of the governor 
when there is high correlation, then perhaps my findings are the result of a significant 
political or economic event which has occurred. Ferguson’s data provides a context in 
which to understand my results. 
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All of this research contributes to our understanding of mass incarceration, 
however none of them but Unah and Coggins (2013) have examined gubernatorial 
rhetoric as a contributing factor to mass incarceration. I contribute to this gap in the 
research by expanding upon the findings in the Unah and Coggins (2013) study. I 
examine a longer time period, 2001-2013, and I implement a survey to test whether or not 
state employees pay attention to the governor. 
 
III. Theory & Hypotheses 
Mass incarceration is a rapidly growing problem that is facing our nation today. I 
attempt to discover why it has increased dramatically lately by answering the question 
“does gubernatorial rhetoric have an effect on the rate of incarceration in a state?” I 
examine the language that the governor of a state uses at the annual (or biennial)  state of 
the state address to see if there is a correlation between crime rhetoric and the subsequent 
rate of incarceration in that state. My theory is that gubernatorial rhetoric is an important 
explanatory factor in the mass incarceration boom. This is possible because government 
employees with the power to make arrests and impact how long an inmate remains 
incarcerated are influenced by the governor’s message. My theory is based on the study 
by Unah and Coggins (2013), which found a statistically significant relationship between 
gubernatorial rhetoric and incarceration rates. In its simplest form, incarceration rate is 
the dependent variable and gubernatorial rhetoric is the independent variable.  
I focus on the state of the state addresses because they occur on a regular and 
predictable basis, and that consistency makes them ideal for the purpose of this research. 
LaChapelle 11 
 
The state of the state address is typically designed to give an overall status update on the 
condition of the state, which means that if crime is a politically salient issue it should be 
mentioned in the speech. I think that the governor’s rhetoric in the state of the state 
address has an impact on incarceration rates, but it is also representative of the governor’s 
other communications with their constituents and state employees. 
In my examination of this phenomenon, I will focus on gubernatorial rhetoric 
from 2001 to 2013 as a causal mechanism for increased incarceration rates. I propose that 
when the governor holds a state of the state address and speaks about crime, the state 
employees in charge of enforcing and making laws listen. These workers include 
members of the legislature, judges, prosecutors, police officers, prison officials, and 
members of parole boards. All of these workers can have an effect, direct or indirect, on 
how many people are arrested in a state and how long they remain incarcerated.  
A governor serves as the head of a state, and she or he has the power to set the 
tone for the upcoming year regarding crime when addressing it at the state of the state. 
While the legislature and chief executive are not always from the same political party, I 
hypothesize that the language a governor uses towards crime (i.e. saying they will be 
“tough on crime” versus expressing a wish for more rehabilitative measures) sets the tone 
for the legislative session. The legislature and chief executive must work together to pass 
legislation (except in the rarer cases where a legislature may override a veto or a 
governor may issue an executive action) and during this speech the governor clearly 
outlines her expectations for the legislative session. 
When the governor addresses the state, members of various police departments 
across the state who listen may also be influenced by the governor’s words. Individual 
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police officers have an incredible amount of discretion available to them in deciding 
whom to arrest and for which charges. If a governor stresses “cracking down” on crime, a 
police officer may interpret that as an order to patrol more vigorously and subsequently 
make more arrests. However if a governor speaks about lowering the rate of incarceration 
and working with individual communities to lower the incidence of crime, a police 
officer on the street may approach citizens differently in an attempt to follow the orders 
of the chief executive. 
While prison officials and corrections officers do not control who comes in to the 
prison, they certainly have the ability to affect how long an inmate stays in prison. The 
supervisors of prisons manage the use of funds and may decide to divide resources evenly 
amongst education and rehabilitative programs, or they may decide to take a more “tough 
on crime” approach and devote all or most funds towards prison security. The decisions 
on how to distribute this money affects inmate attitude, and inmates who do not have the 
ability to participate in enrichment programs may end up breaking more prison rules 
because their time is unoccupied and they are frustrated with the situation. 
 The enforcement of the rules is also dictated by prison officials. If an inmate 
possesses contraband (as set by prison officials), corrections officers and their supervisors 
have the ability to enforce the rules and add time on to an inmate’s prison sentence. Thus, 
a prison official has tremendous power over how many people are incarcerated, and the 
duration of their incarceration. That official’s decisions do not occur in a social vacuum, 
and I argue that the decision is, in part, influenced by the tone set by the governor so that 
the official’s actions will fall in line with the actions of other officials 
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Members of parole boards have the final say in whether or not an inmate is 
released when they are eligible for parole. Parole boards have virtually unchecked power 
to decide whether or not prisoners must serve out the end of their sentence in physical 
custody of the state or on probation. Due to the amount of discretion available to them, if 
the parole boards are influenced by the climate the governor has set towards crime, the 
amount of prisoners who are released from jail can fluctuate dramatically.  
The governor has influential power and the state of the state address is an 
opportunity for the governor to address the entire state with a coherent message. The 
governor’s message may affect how crime is approached by the people of the state, and 
many of those people are involved in criminal corrections decisions. When the people 
who have the power to influence how criminal activity is enforced hear a strong message 
on crime from the governor, incarceration rates are affected. 
 
The Tough Tone Hypothesis (Hypothesis 1):  If a governor’s tone in the state of the 
state address is tough on crime then the rate of incarceration will subsequently 
increase. 
The Soft Tone Hypothesis (Hypothesis 2):  If a governor’s tone in the state of the state 
address is soft on crime then incarceration rates will subsequently decrease. 
The Centrality Hypothesis (Hypothesis 3):  If a governor devotes a substantial amount 
of the state of the state address to discussing the issue of crime, incarceration rates will 
increase. 
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The Aggressiveness Hypothesis (Hypothesis 4):  The more aggressive a governor’s 
tough on crime rhetoric, the more incarceration rates will increase. 
The Expectancy Violation Hypothesis (Hypothesis 5): Incarceration rates will respond 
differently to tough on crime rhetoric from a Republican than from a Democratic 
governor. 
 
IV. Are State Employees Paying Attention to Governors? 
My hypothesis that the governor’s rhetoric in the state of the state address 
influences incarceration rates rests upon the assumption that state employees are listening 
to the state of the state speech. In order to examine this assumption, I conducted a survey 
of North Carolina state officials from five job categories: prison wardens, police chiefs, 
parole board members, magistrates, and district attorneys, asking them about their 
attendance of and attention to the state of the state address. I selected these categories 
because they represent state employees that have influence over the criminal justice 
process.  
Prison wardens can toughen or relax rule enforcement in their prison, which 
impacts a prisoner’s behavioral and criminal record and in turn affects their eligibility for 
release. A prison warden could also increase or decrease funding toward rehabilitative 
and educational programs at the prison, which affect recidivism rates. Police chiefs can 
direct their officers to crack down on criminal activity and increase arrest rates, or they 
could encourage officers to get involved with the community and focus on crime 
prevention rather than punishment. Parole board members have direct involvement with 
the incarceration rate in a state, as they have authority over whether or not a prisoner can 
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be paroled. Magistrates are often the first member of the judiciary to become involved in 
criminal cases, as they have the power to issue warrants for arrest and set bail. A 
magistrate could take a more lenient approach and issue fewer warrants and lower bail, or 
they could take a tougher stance and issue more warrants and set higher bails. For this 
study I wanted to include both judges and magistrates, however the email addresses of 
judges in North Carolina are not publicly available, and I was not able to obtain access to 
them from the Administrative Office of the Courts. District attorneys are in charge of all 
prosecution in a judicial district and as such they have influence over the toughness of 
sentences sought, and the amount of plea deals they are willing to negotiate. 
The Survey 
I received approval for an online survey from the Institutional Review Board at 
the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, IRB #15-0206. I collected the email 
addresses of these public officials from publicly available employee contact databases 
hosted by the State of North Carolina. I sent the online survey administered by Qualtrics 
to 985 potential participants and received 241 completed responses, for a participation 
rate of 25%. The survey contained 10 questions, which were aimed at understanding if 
and why state employees pay attention to the governor. See Appendix A for the 
questionnaire. I sent a total of four emails to the potential respondents; an initial email 
asking them to take the survey and three follow up reminders. Each of the emails were 
spaced about one week apart, the highest response rate was recorded after the final email 
reminder was sent. 
 The responses to the survey expose the complexity of how state employees listen 
to the governor’s message. Figure 1 shows the response to the survey question “if the 
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governor’s office announces that there will be a state of the state speech do you attempt 
to watch or listen to the speech?” Over three quarters of respondents (76%) answered that 
they do attempt to watch or listen to the speech, and about one quarter (24%) said that 
they never attempt to do so. This overwhelming majority suggests that state employees 
do listen to the governor’s speech, however the responses to the question in Figure 2 
show a different phenomenon. In response to the question “did you watch or listen to the 
state of the state address the last time that the governor delivered the state address?” over 
three quarters of respondents answered no, and one quarter answered yes.  
 
Figure 1- Responses to survey question 1 
 
Somewhat surprisingly, the responses to questions one and two are flipped. This 
could be explained in several ways, one potential explanation is that the state employees 
do not actually pay attention to the governor and the responses to question one are the 
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result of the social desirability effect. The effect could cause respondents to indicate that 
they do attempt to listen to the speech in question one, even if they do not, because that is 
the more socially desirable choice. When those same respondents get to question two 
they are faced with two possible responses, and the socially desirable answer would force 
them to more directly lie. 
 
Figure 2- Responses to survey question 2 
 
Another possible explanation is that state employees do listen to the state of the 
state address, but that they had not yet watched or listened to it by the time they took the 
survey. I first sent out the survey on February 20th 2015, less than 3 weeks after the state 
of the state address on February 4th 2015. It is possible that some of the 78% of 
respondents who did not listen to the speech will listen to it or listened after they 
responded to the survey.  
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Figure 3- Responses to survey question 4 
 
Additionally, this survey does not account for the possibility that a state employee 
may pay attention to governor’s message via other methods such as press releases, policy 
memos, direct quotes in news reports, social media posts, or special television 
programming focused on the speech. The responses to question 4, which are in Figure 3, 
demonstrate that 82% of respondents attempt to implement the governor’s policy 
proposals. This question does not specifically ask about policy proposals in the state of 
the state address, so the responses are more representative of how state employees 
interact with the governor’s message more generally. Given the range of possible 
explanations it seems likely that state employees do in fact listen to the governor’s 
message. They may not receive the message directly from the state of the state address, 
but it seems that they do pay attention to the governor’s message.  
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Figure 4- Responses to survey question 9 
 
 Figure 4 shows the self-reported political ideologies of the respondents, which are 
skewed towards conservative. This is reassuring because it is consistent with the overall 
politics of North Carolina. There was a significant amount of respondents who selected 
“middle of the road,” which could be the result of a general reluctance amongst the 
population to admit bias in one direction or another. It could also reflect a general sense 
amongst state officials, particularly in the judiciary, that neutrality is a key responsibility 
of their job. 
Summary 
The responses in the survey suggest that state employees do listen to the 
governor’s policy message and will willingly implement the policy proposals the 
governor makes. These findings provide some clarity on the causal mechanism of my 
theory that state officials listen to the governor and adjust their actions to reflect the 
governor’s message. Overall, this gives suggestive support for my hypothesis that 
gubernatorial rhetoric affects incarceration rates in a state. 
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To further develop this survey as a tool I would like to do it again for employees 
of each state. This would allow me to get a fuller understanding of how state employees 
interact with the state of the state address. If I had this data for each state, I could add 
state employee attendance rates as a variable in my overall dataset and use it as a 
predictor for incarceration rates. Additionally, it would serve the purpose of this thesis to 
include all state judges- district court, superior court, and supreme court, rather than just 
magistrates. While magistrates do have power and influence in the criminal justice 
system, a dataset with all types of judges as respondents would be more robust. 
 
V. Methods 
Dependent Variable Selection 
The dependent variable I examined is the incarceration rate of each state from 
2001 to 2013, however there are several different metrics to measure incarceration rate. 
The two main forms of the dependent variable are custody rate and jurisdiction rate. The 
data are recorded at yearend by the Bureau of Justice Statistics and reported in the 
Corrections Statistical Analysis Tool. Calculation descriptions of all variables are 
available in Appendix C.  
Jurisdiction numbers are almost always higher than custody numbers because they 
represent the entire population of inmates over which the state corrections agency has 
authority, regardless of their physical location inside or outside the state. In contrast, 
“custody [numbers] include all inmates held within a state's facilities, including inmates 
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housed for other states. The custody [numbers] exclude inmates held in local jails and in 
other jurisdictions” (Bonczar 2015).  
I analyze the jurisdiction and custody variables for this project, but based on the 
two major differences between custody and jurisdiction, it seems that custody is more 
relevant to the purpose of this project. The first difference between the variables, that 
custody excludes prisoners who are housed in facilities out of state, impacts the political 
salience and consequences of incarceration. If prisoners are sent to other states for 
incarceration, issues of overcrowding and money invested in the prison system are not as 
much of a pressing concern to the public since they are less visible. Governors typically 
address the most relevant political topics in the state of the state address and since I am 
interested in the political consequences of incarceration, custody numbers are more 
relevant. The second difference in the variables, that custody excludes inmates housed in 
local jails, suggests that custody numbers only include people sentenced to a prison term 
greater than one year. Typically sentences of less than one year are served in local jail 
facilities. By focusing on custody numbers, I restrict my data set to more severe 
convictions, which are more salient for public concerns. 
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Figure 5- Average jurisdiction counts and custody counts by state 
 
I am least interested in custody count and jurisdiction count because they do not 
account for the population of a state, which misrepresents incarceration data and skews it 
towards bigger states. Figure 5 shows that Texas, California, and Florida have the highest 
average jurisdiction and custody counts from 2001-2013, but those are some of the 
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largest states in the union. Figure 6 adjusts those counts for population size, and shows 
that Louisiana, Delaware, and Mississippi have the highest jurisdiction and custody rates. 
Louisiana has the highest jurisdiction rate out of all of the states, but it is tenth in 
jurisdiction count. From 2001 to 2013, Louisiana had on average jurisdiction over 845 
prisoners per 100,000 citizens, which is much higher than the mean of 432 per 100,000 
for all states. During the same period, Louisiana had on average jurisdiction over 37,865 
total prisoners, which is still higher than the mean of all states of 27,016. However, this 
number pales in comparison to Texas’ average jurisdiction count of 168,944, but Texas is 
much larger than Louisiana. Another similar case is Delaware which had the second 
highest average jurisdiction rate of 805 per 100,000 citizens, but the 36th highest 
jurisdiction count of 6,923 prisoners because it is a smalls state. If I used plain 
jurisdiction or custody count as my dependent variable, I would not get an accurate 
understanding of the level of incarceration in a state. 
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Figure 6- Average jurisdiction rates and custody rates by state 
 
Although custody count change and jurisdiction count change are based on the 
less reliable counts, they are acceptable because they deal with proportions. Each variable 
represents the percent change in count from the last year to the current year. By 
converting these variables to rates, they are viable to be used as dependent variables for 
robustness checks. 
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Independent Variable Selection 
 My main independent variable of interest, gubernatorial rhetoric on crime, is not 
as easily quantifiable as is incarceration rate. In order to capture and analyze the rhetoric, 
I used SAS® text analytics software to examine and code each paragraph of every speech 
as either tough or soft on crime. I used a combination of SAS® Text Miner (TM) and 
SAS® Contextual Analysis (SCA) to explore the data, and SAS® Enterprise Content 
Categorization (ECC) to score the speeches. The final text analysis model was created in 
collaboration with Teresa Jade, David Bultman, and Michael Wallis, developers at SAS 
Institute who focus specifically on text analytics. 
I collected all of the speeches I used from Stateline.org, a Pew Charitable Trust. 
In total I had 626 speeches which covered the years 2001-2014, every state does not 
require a state of the state address each year. For example, it is convention in North 
Carolina for the governor to hold a state of the state address in odd-numbered years even 
though the NC Constitution only requires that “the Governor shall from time to time give 
the General Assembly information of the affairs of the State and recommend to their 
consideration such measures as he shall deem expedient” (Art 2, § 5). I used the text 
analysis model to analyze the 41 speeches from 2014, but they are not included in my 
analysis because the incarceration data has not yet been published. 
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Figure 7- SAS Contextual Analysis process overview (from SCA User’s Guide) 
 
Figure 7 shows the process overview of SAS Contextual Analysis, which starts by 
using training documents, which are all of the speeches for this project, to extract terms 
and generate topics (SAS 2014). During the word extraction process, SCA excludes 
words it deems not valuable to the analysis such as articles, conjunctions, and other 
insignificant terms. SCA “combines the machine-learning capabilities of SAS Text Miner 
with the rules-based linguistic methods of categorization and extraction in SAS 
Enterprise Content Categorization” (SAS 2014).  
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Figure 8- Prison term map (from SCA) 
 
For this project, I used SCA to extract terms and generate topics to get a sense of 
the kind of rhetoric governors use, particularly about crime, in their speeches. Many of 
the generated topics were not about crime, the most popular topics were medicare, 
education, and social security. For the few automatically generated crime concepts, like 
recidivism and prison, I created term maps to explore the connections between other 
commonly used terms. In a term map, the color of a circle indicates the conditional 
probability that it is found in a document given that the parent term exists. Dark circles 
designate a high probability and light circles designate a low probability. The size of the 
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circle indicates the number of documents which contain that term in relation to its node, a 
large circle represents a high observation count. 
Figure 8 shows the term map of the node “prison.” The prison term map reveals 
that the terms most commonly used in conjunction with prison are prison population, 
prison system, and non-violent. The expanded branches of the term justice indicates that 
when governors talk about justice in relation to prison, they are often talking about 
criminals and money. This helped me piece together the rules for the text analysis 
program, because it allowed me to understand the connections between the words 
governors use to describe crime.  
 
Figure 9- Recidivism term map 
 
 Figure 9 shows the term map for recidivism, which has many related terms. One 
of the biggest patterns that this term map uncovers is the tendency for governors to talk 
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about reducing the rate when they talk about recidivism. It is also likely that a governor is 
talking about reinvestment or gang violence in the context of recidivism. Many of the 
terms directly connected to recidivism suggest a sense of prevention and reduction, which 
is not a “tough on crime” concept. As a result, I classified recidivism as a concept in the 
soft on crime category. I was able to repeat this process for all of the crime topics 
automatically generated by SCA, which vastly improved my understanding of the data.  
I used SAS Text Miner in a similar data exploration process to make informed 
decisions about my rules for the text analysis. I used SAS Enterprise Content 
Categorization for the actual building of the model because it allowed me to create more 
detailed custom rules and topics. Since I was specifically looking for crime language, 
SCA was not a good choice to build the model because there were not many significant 
automatically generated crime topics for all of the speeches. SCA would have been a 
more appropriate model building tool if my goal was to understand the most common 
themes and concepts of the speeches, rather than to have a complex understanding of one 
topic. SAS Enterprise Content Categorization is a software program that is “designed to 
develop and deploy categorization and extraction rules to classify unstructured content” 
(SAS 2013). The model for this project is based off of a user-created hierarchy of rules, 
concepts, classifiers, and match strings that are specific to this project. 
When defining what counts as tough and soft, my approach was to base it on 
whether or not the ultimate goal of the text was to increase incarceration by increasing 
sentence length or arresting more people. If so, it counts as tough, but if it is about 
decreasing sentences and prison populations or encouraging rehabilitation then it is soft 
on crime. This is designed to represent the two main approaches governors often take 
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towards crime- punitive or correctional. For example, I chose to put drug court in the soft 
category because even though it is a court that can and does dole out prison sentences, the 
main focus of the program is treatment and rehabilitation in lieu of imprisonment. Words 
like “crack down,” however, are in the tough category because they indicate a governor’s 
intention to more aggressively fight and punish crime.  
To create my model I created different sets of rules to classify whether a piece of 
text is tough or soft on crime. A detailed list of the concepts which comprise the rules is 
in Appendix B. The first rule, Crime Words, indicates whether text is about crime, 
regardless of the tone. A subset of the Crime Words rule is Tough Words, which when 
found in the context of Crime Words indicates the text is tough on crime. Tough Words 
must be found within a distance of sixteen tokens from Crime Words. In this case, a 
token represents a break on white space in a text. Another subset of Crime Words is Soft 
Words, which operates in the same manner as Tough Words, but it indicates whether a 
text is soft on crime.  
 Next, there is the “Tough On” rule and the “Soft On” rule, which label each 
paragraph as either tough on crime, soft on crime, or neither. The Tough On rule is Crime 
Words plus Tough Words and stand-alone terms. The stand-alone terms are words such 
as “sexual predator” or “terrorism” that always indicate a tough on crime stance, 
regardless of the surrounding words. The Soft On rule operates in the same manner as 
Tough On, but the standalone terms are words like “reform the justice system” and 
“rehabilitative sentences.” 
Using the Tough On rule and the Soft On rule, each paragraph is deemed by the 
model to be tough, soft, or neither. In the few cases where a paragraph was matched to 
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both tough and soft terms, I read it and decided which label was most appropriate. From 
this label, I was able to create a variable indicating the proportion of the speech that is 
tough on crime. This is calculated by the number of tough paragraphs divided by the total 
number of paragraphs in a speech. I also created variables for soft proportion, and crime 
proportion which are calculated in the same manner. 
Each of the paragraphs labeled tough on crime has a corresponding tough match 
string. This match string is the specific concept of the rule that the text contains. For each 
tough match string, Dr. Isaac Unah and I ranked its level of aggressiveness on crime. Dr. 
Unah and I made the rankings together and compared any differences in our rankings in 
an attempt to create rank consistency across match strings. For each match string, we read 
a sample of the concordance of the observations to determine if there was a pattern to the 
aggressiveness of the rhetoric. We ranked the aggressiveness on a scale of 1 through 5, 
with 5 being the most aggressive. The numerical ranking of each match string is 
contained in Appendix D. 
 We measured aggressiveness based on level of imminence of the sentiment. This 
is based on the legal doctrine on speech announced in Schenck vs. United States. Schenck 
is a Supreme Court case in which a standard of “clear and present danger” was set for 
government interference in free speech when the evil in the speech is imminent (1918). 
While this is applied to a different context, it is the same concept. For example, according 
to our rankings “bomb threat” is less imminent and thus less aggressive than “bombing.” 
Additionally, if a governor talks about sexual crimes or crimes against children it is pretty 
tough because of the implications. Once we ranked each of these match strings, we took 
the highest one for each paragraph and summed the total of all paragraphs in a speech for 
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the aggressiveness variable. For example, if a speech has two paragraphs that are tough 
on crime, one with a match and rank 1, and another with two matches of rank 5 and 3, the 
total for the speech would be 6. 
There are many well-documented factors which affect incarceration rates, so I 
included some of the most relevant variables in my dataset to improve the explanatory 
power of my models. One of these such variables is the region of the country where each 
state is located. I coded this variable as a dummy South or non-South since that is where 
there is the most variation between regions in punishment politics. To measure the 
political ideology of the governor, I added to the dataset the governor’s political party 
affiliation. This gives a sense of the political leaning of the state at the time of the speech, 
and it also allows us to examine any link between crime rhetoric, incarceration, and the 
political party identification of the governor. As an indicator of demographics of a state, I 
added a variable for the percent of a state’s Black population since Black citizens are 
incarcerated at a higher rate than white citizens (Yates and Fording 2005). I retrieved this 
information from the Statistical Abstract of the United States (Bureau of Census 2013 & 
2014). Finally, I included a variable for the interaction between South and percent Black, 
since the Black population in the US is highly concentrated in the South.  
 
VI. Data & Results 
Regression Models 
To determine if there is a statistically significant relationship between 
gubernatorial rhetoric and incarceration rates, I use the Generalized Least Squares 
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Regression technique to estimate the parameters of several models. Since the data is 
sorted by state and year, I treat it as panel data to do a cross sectional time series analysis. 
There is a lag of almost one year built in to the data because the state of the state is given 
at the beginning of the year and the incarceration information is recorded at yearend. 
 
Table A- Regression model on state corrections custody rate by governor’s political party 
Explaining State Corrections Custody Rate by Governor PID, 2001-2013 
 All Governors Republican Governor Democratic Governor 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Governor PID 14.42***              
(4.53) 
  
Tough Proportion 295.48**               
(144.57) 
-8.67 
(332.11) 
537.32*** 
(205.86) 
Soft Proportion 93.52                  
(336.59) 
470.77 
(388.54) 
-226.83 
(441.14) 
South 69.77***                   
(3.60) 
113.36*** 
(12.39) 
38.70*** 
(15.19) 
Percent Black 4.03***                    
(0.40) 
1.53*** 
(0.60) 
6.05*** 
(0.67) 
Constant 327.26***             
(6.60) 
357.92*** 
(9.50) 
303.52*** 
(4.40) 
Clustered by year, 
calculated with 
robust standard 
error. 
Sample size = 648                                                                                                        
Wald Chi Sq.= 
5193; P<.0001                                                                                          
R2 =0.2183 
Sample size = 338 
Wald Chi Sq.= 298; 
P<.0001 
R2 =0.2120 
Sample size = 302 
Wald Chi Sq.= 2573; 
P<.0001 
R2 =0.2298 
*p<.1 or better, **p<.05 or better, ***p<.01 or better 
 I determined that model 1, shown in Table A, is the best model. It includes all of 
the independent variables and has an R2 of 22%. I used robust standard error for this 
model to make it more resilient to a change in the variables. This improves the reliability 
of the model. I use custody rate as the dependent variable because rate is a widely 
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accepted method of measuring incarceration, and as I previously described custody is 
more ideal than jurisdiction in this context.  
In model 1, the governor’s political party identification, the tough proportion of 
the speech, South vs non-South, percent of Black citizens, and the constant are all 
statistically significant. The only independent variable that is not significant is the 
proportion of the speech that is soft on crime. This model suggests that for every 1% 
increase in the proportion of speech that is tough on crime, the custody rate increases by 
295 inmates per 100,000 citizens, holding all other variables constant. Thus, the value for 
this parameter is consistent with hypothesis 1. Model 1 also suggests that a state in the 
South has a custody rate of 70 inmates per 100,000 citizens higher than states outside the 
South, and that for every 1% increase in the population of Black citizens in a state, 
custody rate increases by 4 inmates per 100,000 citizens. Finally, the model suggests that 
if all of the independent variables in the model are valued at 0, the custody rate will be 
327 inmates per 100,000 citizens. 
 Models 2 and 3 are variations of model 1; model 2 is specific to Republican 
governors and model 3 is specific to Democratic governors. Compared to model 1, model 
2 is no longer significant for tough proportion and model 3 is more significant, with a 
higher coefficient. This means that the significance of tough proportion in model 1 was 
because of the Democratic governors. The interpretation of this finding is that when a 
Democratic governor is tough on crime, the custody rate increases by 537 inmates per 
100,000 citizens for every 1% increase in tough on crime rhetoric, but when a Republican 
governor is tough on crime the custody rate is not affected. I believe this to be the result 
of political expectations; Republicans are expected to use a tough on crime narrative so 
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when they do, nothing changes because it is normal and expected. Democratic governors 
are not generally expected to employ a tough on crime narrative, so when they do people 
listen. It is also possible that Democratic governors use tough on crime rhetoric in 
response to a highly salient event, like a violent tragedy, and that could also contribute to 
the increase in incarceration. 
 
Table B- Regression model on state corrections jurisdiction rate by governor’s political party 
Explaining State Corrections Jurisdiction Rate by Governor PID, 2001-2013  
 All Governors Republican 
Governors 
Democratic 
Governors 
Variable Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Governor PID 16.56*** 
(5.15) 
  
Tough Proportion 194.84 
(135.89) 
1.09 
(242.32) 
372.96* 
(200.69) 
Soft Proportion -103.84 
(376.00) 
178.63 
(478.21) 
-352.85 
(470.69) 
South 116.76*** 
(6.46) 
142.64*** 
(11.53) 
97.24*** 
(19.00) 
Percent Black 5.45*** 
(0.46) 
  
Percent Black Centered  4.23*** 
(0.43) 
6.10*** 
(1.02) 
Constant 333.95*** 
(6.30) 
402.06*** 
(9.16) 
382.67*** 
(8.66) 
Clustered by year, 
calculated with robust 
standard error. 
Sample size = 648                                                                                                         
Wald Chi Sq.= 
31710; P<.0001                                                                                          
R2 =0.3720 
Sample size = 338                                                                                                         
Wald Chi Sq.= 
674; P<.0001                                                                                          
R2 =0.3845 
Sample size = 302                                                                      
Wald Chi Sq.= 
360; P<.0001                                                                  
R2 =0.3383 
*p<.1 or better, **p<.05 or better, ***p<.01 or better 
 Table B shows models 4, 5, and 6, which are almost identical to models 1, 2, and 
3, but with jurisdiction rate as the dependent variable. For models 5 and 6 I included the 
variable percent Black centered to test whether or not the centering of this variable would 
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have an effect. The percent Black and percent Black centered variables were consistent 
with each other, so I concluded that percent Black is reliable as an indicator on its own. 
The findings are similar to those of models 1, 2, and 3, but tough proportion is not 
significant in model 4, and it is less significant in model 6. This suggests that custody rate 
is a more reasonable metric than jurisdiction rate for explaining incarceration numbers by 
gubernatorial rhetoric. Models 5 and 6 show the same relationship to governor party 
affiliation as models 2 and 3, which supports hypothesis 5. 
 
Table C- Regression model on state corrections jurisdiction rate change 
Model 7: Explaining State Corrections Jurisdiction Rate Change, 2001-2013 
Variable Coefficient S.E. Z value 
Tough Proportion 0.0994** 0.0464 2.14 
Soft Proportion -0.0651 0.0753 -0.86 
Governor PID -0.0001 0.0019 -0.09 
South 0.0078 0.0053 1.47 
Percent Black -0.0015*** 0.0004 -3.35 
Black & South Interaction 0.0007* 0.0004 1.76 
Constant 0.0134** 0.0056 2.4 
Clustered by year, calculated 
with robust standard error. 
Sample size = 648                                                                                                                   
Wald Chi Sq.= 23; P<.0007                                                                                                         
R2 =0.0487 
*p<.1 or better, **p<.05 or better, ***p<.01 or better 
 Model 7, in Table C, is a variation of model 1 with jurisdiction rate change as the 
dependent variable and Black & south interaction added as in independent variable. 
Tough proportion is still significant, which supports hypothesis 1. Compared to model 1, 
south is no longer significant in model 7 which suggests that there is a difference in 
behavior of states that are in the South and non-South. The behavior of the percent Black 
variable is contingent on whether we are talking about a Southern or non-Southern state, 
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so the region matters. Percent Black is a complex variable, just because there are more 
Black people in a state does not mean that there will be a higher incarceration rate, it 
depends on if the state is in the South.  
 
Table D- Regression model on state corrections custody rate change 
Explaining State Corrections Custody Rate Change, 2001-2013 
Variable Model 8 Model 9 
Tough Proportion 0.1405***                  
(0.0423) 
0.1035***                
(0.0412) 
Soft Proportion -0.0131                       
(0.0578) 
0.0072                      
(0.0497) 
Governor PID 0.0015                         
(0.0016) 
0.0017                            
(0.0016) 
South 0.0016                              
(0.0052) 
0.0099***                         
(0.0041) 
Percent Black -0.0016***                    
(0.0005) 
-0.001***                
(0.0003) 
Black & South Interaction 0.0008*                      
(0.0005) 
 
Constant 0.0135**                     
(0.0061) 
0.0109**                  
(0.0052) 
Clustered by year, 
calculated with robust 
standard error. 
Sample size = 648           
Wald Chi Sq.= 33; P<.0001  
R2 =0.0427 
Sample size = 648               
Wald Chi Sq.= 31; P<.0001   
R2 =0.0387 
*p<.1 or better, **p<.05 or better, ***p<.01 or better 
 Models 8 and 9 in Table D are variations of model 1 with custody rate change as a 
dependent variable and with the Black & South interaction variable added to model 9. 
Both models 8 and 9 show higher significance for tough proportion than model 1, but 
governor party identification is no longer significant in model 8 or 9. Since I 
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demonstrated with models 2, 3, 5, and 6 that governor party identification is significant, I 
conclude that custody rate change is not as good of a dependent variable as custody rate 
for this topic. When Black & South interaction is removed from model 8, the results are 
in model 9; percent Black and now has a negative coefficient and South is more 
significant. This is consistent with the finding in model 7. 
 
Table E- Regression model on state corrections jurisdiction count change 
Explaining State Corrections Jurisdiction Count Change, 2001-2013 
Variable Model 10 Model 11 
Tough Proportion 0.1025** 
(0.0470) 
0.0835* 
(0.0449) 
Soft Proportion -0.0665 
(0.0717) 
-0.0598 
(0.0678) 
Governor PID 0.0006 
(0.0018) 
0.0011 
(0.00181) 
South 0.0072 
(0.0051) 
0.0198*** 
(0.0037) 
Percent Black -0.0020*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0013*** 
(0.0003) 
Black & South Interaction ***0.0012 
(0.0003) 
 
Constant ***0.0246 
(0.0054) 
0.0204*** 
(0.0050) 
Clustered by year, 
calculated with robust 
standard error. 
Sample size = 338                
Wald Chi Sq.= 298; 
P<.0001                              
R2 =0.2120 
Sample size = 302             
Wald Chi Sq.= 2573; 
P<.0001                              
R2 =0.2298 
*p<.1 or better, **p<.05 or better, ***p<.01 or better 
 Models 10 and 11 in Table E have the same independent variables as models 8 
and 9, but now jurisdiction rate change is the dependent variable. The only difference in 
results from models 8 and 9 is that tough proportion is no longer significant at the p<.01 
level, rather it is now significant at the p<.05 for model 10 p<.1 level for model 11. This 
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loss in significance indicates that custody rate change is more reasonable than jurisdiction 
count change among as a dependent variable, which is consistent with my earlier 
conjecture that custody is more reasonable than jurisdiction and that rate is more 
appropriate than count for this project. 
 
Table F- Regression model on state corrections custody count change 
Explaining State Corrections Custody Count Change, 2001-2013 
Variable Model 12 Model 13 
Tough Proportion 0.1467***                        
(0.0415) 
0.1147***                 
(0.0407) 
Soft Proportion -0.0215                         
(0.0557) 
-0.0046                         
(0.05) 
Governor PID 0.0022522                          
(0.0016) 
0.0028*                     
(0.0016) 
South 0.0008                               
(0.0051) 
0.0149***                    
(0.0038) 
Percent Black -0.0021***                         
(0.0005) 
-0.0013***                       
(0.0003) 
Black & South Interaction 0.0013***                  
(0.0004) 
 
Constant 0.0248***                   
(0.0059) 
0.0202***                       
(0.0052) 
Clustered by year, 
calculated with robust 
standard error. 
Sample size = 648                
Wald Chi Sq.= 48; P<.0001    
R2 =0.0626 
Sample size = 648             
Wald Chi Sq.= 46; P<.0001 
R2 =0.0525 
*p<.1 or better, **p<.05 or better, ***p<.01 or better 
 Models 12 and 13 in Table F are the same as models 10 and 11, but with custody 
count change as the dependent variable instead of jurisdiction count change. In model 12, 
the coefficient of tough proportion is higher than in model 10, and it suggests that for 
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every 1% increase in the tough proportion of a speech, custody count will increase by 
15% from the previous year. Additionally, governor party identification is significant in 
model 13 but not model 12, which means that the exclusion of the interaction effect in 
model 12 enhances the coefficient for governor party affiliation in that model. 
 
Table G- Regression model on state corrections custody rate with alternative variables 
Explaining State Corrections Custody Rate by Crime Proportion and Aggressiveness, 
2001-1013 
Variable Model 14 Model 15 
Tough Proportion  262.56 
(322.06) 
266.73 
(298.89)  
Soft Proportion  449.78 
(385.34) 
95.12 
(294.86) 
Governor PID  13.81*** 
(5.14) 
14.41*** 
(5.15) 
South  71.03*** 
(15.56) 
70.02*** 
(15.72) 
Percent Black 3.96*** 
(0.77) 
4.02*** 
(0.77) 
Crime Proportion  536.49** 
(246.54) 
 
Aggressiveness   0.11 
(0.89) 
Constant  322.43*** 
(8.78) 
327.07*** 
(8.65) 
 Sample size = 648                
Wald Chi Sq.= 185; P<.0001    
R2 =0.2241 
Sample size = 648             
Wald Chi Sq.= 179; P<.0001 
R2 =0.2184 
*p<.1 or better, **p<.05 or better, ***p<.01 or better 
Models 14 and 15, shown in Table G, are similar to model 1 but with the crime 
proportion and aggressiveness variables added, respectively. Additionally, models 14 and 
15 are not clustered by year and do not use robust standard errors. Typically robust 
standard errors are used to decrease the standard error of a model and thus increase 
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resiliency, but it had the opposite effect this time so I used normal standard errors. Model 
14 suggests that for every 1% increase in the proportion of a speech that is about crime, 
the custody rate increases by 536 inmates per 100,000 citizens. The parameters of the 
other independent variables remained roughly the same, except that tough proportion is 
no longer significant. Since I have demonstrated the resiliency of model 1, I am confident 
that support for hypothesis 3 is generalizable across the other potential models. Model 15 
does not support hypothesis 4 since aggressiveness is not statistically significant. I 
expected this finding because the aggressiveness variable was formed by my ranking of 
aggressiveness by match string, which is difficult to consistently and out of context.  
 
Table H- Summary of findings by hypothesis 
Hypothesis Supporting Models 
1 1, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 
2 None of the models 
3 14 
4 None of the models 
5 2, 3, 5, 6 
 
 Table H contains a summary of the findings across all models by hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1, which maintains that tough rhetoric contributes to an increase in 
incarceration rates was widely supported. Hypothesis 2, that soft on crime rhetoric 
contributes to a decrease in incarceration rates, was not supported by any models. The 
support for hypothesis 1 and the lack of support for hypothesis 2 suggests that tough 
rhetoric is more powerful than soft rhetoric. Hypothesis 3, that an increase in crime 
rhetoric contributes to an increase in incarceration rates was supported by model 14, 
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which is a form of the general model 1. Hypothesis 4, the more aggressive a governor’s 
rhetoric is the more incarceration rates increase, was not supported in any of the models. 
Hypothesis 5, that incarceration rates respond differently to Democratic governors versus 
Republican governors was supported by models 2, 3, 5, and 6.  
This project did not rely on the same set of variables or the same text analysis 
technique as Unah and Coggins (2013), but it is consistent with their findings. This 
further supports the finding that tough on crime gubernatorial rhetoric contributes to an 
increase in incarceration rates. 
Predictive Analysis via Machine Learning 
The data that I used for the regression analysis can also be applied to a predictive 
analysis model. Using SAS Enterprise Miner Neural Network, I created a model to 
predict the jurisdiction count in a state based on the rhetoric in the speech. This particular 
modeling node is configured with a multilayer perceptron using an “average error” model 
selection criterion. The model takes into account the singular value decomposition (SVD) 
values produced by the text topic node, such as specific crime topics, along with other 
structured variables, like state, and year, etc. This model shows that we can obtain a good 
fit for predictive capabilities. A plot of the predicted versus actual jurisdiction counts for 
each state in 2013 is in Figure 10. As the plot shows, this trained model is incredibly 
accurate, the only state for which there is a noticeable difference between predicted and 
actual is Texas. 
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Figure 10- Jurisdiction count predictions by state for 2013 
 
This predictive analysis model uses jurisdiction count as the dependent variable 
because that is what the neural network selected as the most accurate variable to predict. 
For this purpose, count is more accurate because rate is dependent on population, which 
we also do not know. More training of the model, which can happen with more input 
variables and more predictions with known residuals, the machine learning will improve 
so that we can forecast future values with this model.  
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VII. Conclusion 
The key finding of this research project is that the tougher a governor is on crime 
in the state of the state address, the more we can expect incarceration rates to increase. 
This result was consistent across 10 of the models I tested, which implies that it is fairly 
robust and generalizable. There are many researched variables that affect incarceration 
rates, and my analysis suggests that gubernatorial rhetoric is a contributing factor to 
increasing incarceration rates. 
While there has been much attention to and research on the mass incarceration 
epidemic, there is not substantial exploration of gubernatorial rhetoric as a causal 
mechanism. Unah and Coggins’ (2013) research examines this, but only for a period of 
four years. The text analysis model in this project is the first of its kind on this topic, and 
it can be quickly and easily applied to new speeches through an automated process. 
This project could be improved with a time period expansion, especially to the 
1960’s, which would give a fuller picture of the mass incarceration epidemic. That would 
allow us to see how, if at all, gubernatorial rhetoric’s influence on incarceration has 
changed over that period. Another area for improvement is in the refinement text analysis 
model. While the model that I have is robust and was created in conjunction with experts, 
there is always room for improvement, particularly with the soft on crime category. Soft 
on crime sentiment is harder to capture than tough on crime because when someone is 
soft on crime it is more subtle than when someone is tough on crime. Because of that, 
there are fewer rules soft on crime rules, which could be further explored. The addition of 
more control variables like poverty levels, wealth inequality, and crime victimization 
rates, could improve the explanatory power of the model. Finally, this project could be 
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expanded to examine gubernatorial rhetoric outside of state of the state addresses. For 
example, one could also analyze gubernatorial rhetoric in policy memos and press 
conferences, which would drastically increase the size and robustness of the dataset. This 
is possible with more sophisticated web crawling techniques. 
It is essential to understand as much as possible about the phenomenon of mass 
incarceration in order to affect change. My findings show that gubernatorial rhetoric 
contributes to incarceration rate increases, which points to an area to target for affecting 
change- the governor and his or her rhetoric.  
I have developed the beginning of a predictive analysis model of incarceration, 
which could be used to better understand, explain, and predict how incarceration rates 
will change as a result of input variables. 
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IX. Appendices 
Appendix A- Survey Questions and Responses 
 
1.  If the Governor’s office announces that there will be a state of the state address do 
you attempt to watch or listen to the speech? 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 Never   
 
57 24% 
2 Sometimes   
 
136 56% 
3 Often   
 
31 13% 
4 Always   
 
17 7% 
 Total  241 100% 
 
Statistic Value 
Min Value 1 
Max Value 4 
Mean 2.04 
Variance 0.65 
Standard Deviation 0.80 
Total Responses 239 
 
2.  Did you watch or listen to the state of the state address the last time that the 
Governor delivered the state of the state address? 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 Yes   
 
54 22% 
2 No   
 
187 78% 
 Total  241 100% 
 
Statistic Value 
Min Value 1 
Max Value 2 
Mean 1.77 
Variance 0.18 
Standard Deviation 0.42 
Total Responses 239 
 
3.  Did the last state of the state address contain any policy information relevant to 
your agency? 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 Yes   
 
108 51% 
2 No   
 
103 49% 
 Total  211 100% 
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Statistic Value 
Min Value 1 
Max Value 2 
Mean 1.48 
Variance 0.25 
Standard Deviation 0.50 
Total Responses 209 
 
4.  When the Governor proposes an activity directly relevant to your agency, how 
vigorously do you attempt to implement the activity? 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 
Not at all 
vigorously 
  
 
41 18% 
2 
Somewhat 
Vigorously 
  
 
67 30% 
3 
Fairly 
Vigorously 
  
 
83 37% 
4 
Extremely 
Vigorously 
  
 
33 15% 
 Total  224 100% 
 
Statistic Value 
Min Value 1 
Max Value 4 
Mean 2.48 
Variance 0.92 
Standard Deviation 0.96 
Total Responses 222 
 
5.  Before the most recent state of the state address did your supervisor encourage 
you to watch or listen to it? 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 Yes   
 
23 10% 
2 No   
 
215 90% 
 Total  238 100% 
 
Statistic Value 
Min Value 1 
Max Value 2 
Mean 1.90 
Variance 0.09 
Standard Deviation 0.30 
Total Responses 236 
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6.  How long have you worked in your current position? 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 
Less than 2 
years 
  
 
22 22% 
2 
2 years to 
less than 5 
  
 
20 20% 
3 
5 years to 
less than 
10 
  
 
23 23% 
4 
10 years to 
less than 
20 
  
 
24 24% 
5 20+ years   
 
12 12% 
 Total  101 100% 
 
Statistic Value 
Min Value 1 
Max Value 5 
Mean 2.841584 
Variance 1.774653 
Standard Deviation 1.332161 
Total Responses 101 
 
7.  What is the title of the agency for which you work? 
  
Agency Number of Responses 
Administrative Office of the Courts 51 
Custody Mediation 1 
District Attorney 7 
District Court 2 
Department of Transportation 1 
DPS Adult Corrections 1 
Family Court 4 
Judicial Branch 9 
Magistrate 9 
Police Department 14 
State of North Carolina 1 
Supervisor 1 
 
Statistic Value 
Total Responses 101 
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8.  Which of these options best describes your position? 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 
Prison 
warden 
  
 
2 1% 
2 Police chief   
 
14 7% 
3 
Parole board 
member 
 
 
0 0% 
4 Judge   
 
73 39% 
5 Prosecutor   
 
14 7% 
6 Other   
 
84 45% 
 Total  187 100% 
 
Other  
Title Number of Responses 
Administrator 4 
Business Officer 1 
Case Manager 3 
Correctional Sergeant 1 
Court Administrator 3 
District Court Trial Coordinator 1 
Engineer 1 
Family Court Administrator 2 
Gang Intelligence 1 
Judicial Assistant 6 
Magistrate 54 
Medical 1 
Prison Management 1 
Secretary 1 
Teacher 1 
Trial Court Coordinator 2 
Victim Witness Legal Assistant 1 
 
Statistic Value 
Min Value 1 
Max Value 6 
Mean 4.98 
Variance 1.59 
Standard Deviation 1.26 
Total Responses 221 
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9.  How would you describe your political ideology? 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 Very liberal   
 
5 2% 
2 
Moderately 
liberal 
  
 
24 11% 
3 Liberal   
 
20 9% 
4 
Middle of the 
road 
  
 
75 35% 
5 Conservative   
 
57 27% 
6 
Moderately 
conservative 
  
 
20 9% 
7 
Very 
conservative 
  
 
13 6% 
 Total  214 100% 
 
Statistic Value 
Min Value 1 
Max Value 7 
Mean 4.26 
Variance 1.87 
Standard Deviation 1.37 
Total Responses 213 
 
 
10.  How do you identify your gender? 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 Male   
 
118 54% 
2 Female   
 
100 46% 
3 Other  
 
0 0% 
 Total  218 100% 
 
Other 
 
Statistic Value 
Min Value 1 
Max Value 2 
Mean 1.46 
Variance 0.25 
Standard Deviation 0.50 
Total Responses 217 
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Appendix B- Speech Rules 
Crime Rules 
Crime Words:  Crime Words Far:  
NO_BREAK: prescription drug use  
 CONCEPT: crime@ 
#CONCEPT: public safety CONCEPT: criminal@ 
 CONCEPT: offense@ 
#Verb or Noun CONCEPT: prey on 
CONCEPT: law violator@N CONCEPT: those who prey on others 
CONCEPT: felony@ CONCEPT: scam artist@N 
CONCEPT: misdemeanor@  
 CLASSIFIER: incarceration 
CONCEPT: habitual offender@N  
CONCEPT: infraction@ CONCEPT: child abuse 
CONCEPT: drug dealer@N CONCEPT: abuse and neglect 
CONCEPT: drug deal@ 
CONCEPT: abused and neglected 
children 
CONCEPT: drug cartel@N CLASSIFIER: trafficking 
 CLASSIFIER: trafficked 
CONCEPT: drug trade CONCEPT: trafficker@N 
  
CONCEPT: homicide@N CONCEPT: are illegal 
CONCEPT: homicidal CONCEPT: is illegal 
CONCEPT: exploitation CLASSIFIER: punishable 
CONCEPT: gang prevention  
CONCEPT: dog fighting CONCEPT: the killer 
 CONCEPT: the killers 
#illegal  
 CONCEPT: club drugs 
CONCEPT: sale of drugs CONCEPT: drug ring@N 
CONCEPT: illegal video poker CONCEPT: illegal drug@N 
CONCEPT: illegal videopoker CONCEPT: hard-core drugs 
CONCEPT: illegal casino@N CONCEPT: hard drugs 
CONCEPT: illegal distribution CLASSIFIER: meth 
 CLASSIFIER: methamphetamine 
CONCEPT: illegal narcotics CONCEPT: opiate@N 
CONCEPT: illegal perscribers CONCEPT: war on drugs 
CONCEPT: illegal substance CONCEPT: drug war 
CONCEPT: illegal profits CONCEPT: drug laws 
  
#CONCEPT: loophole@ CONCEPT: illegal gambling 
CONCEPT: violation of the law CONCEPT: illegal gun@N 
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CONCEPT: bootlegging 
CONCEPT_RULE: (SENT, 
"_c{steal@}", (OR, "car@N", 
"vehicle@N", "timber", "gun@N", 
"television")) 
CONCEPT: bootlegger@N CONCEPT: identity theft 
CONCEPT: bootleg copy@N CONCEPT: identity thief@N 
CONCEPT: drug activity CONCEPT: stolen identity@N 
CONCEPT: deadly drugs  
CONCEPT: human traffic CONCEPT: reckless driver@N 
CONCEPT: human smugglers CLASSIFIER: unlicensed 
CONCEPT: human smuggling  
  
CONCEPT: child molester@  
CONCEPT: child molestation  
CONCEPT: rape@  
CONCEPT: domestic abuse  
CONCEPT: domestic violence  
CONCEPT: family violence  
CONCEPT: elder abuse  
  
  
CONCEPT: illegally trespass@V  
CONCEPT: shooting@N  
CONCEPT: shooter@N  
CONCEPT: shot and killed  
CONCEPT: using drugs  
  
  
  
#Noun  
CLASSIFIER: criminality  
CLASSIFIER: mafia  
CLASSIFIER: pornography  
CLASSIFIER: pornogrphic  
CONCEPT: pornographer@N  
CLASSIFIER: assault  
CONCEPT: violence  
CONCEPT: murder@  
CONCEPT: murderer@N  
#Moved to ToughOn  
#CONCEPT: sexual predator@N  
#CONCEPT: sexually _w predator  
#CONCEPT: sex offender@N  
  
CONCEPT: reckless drive@V  
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CLASSIFIER: DUI  
CLASSIFIER: DWI  
CLASSIFIER: drunk  
CLASSIFIER: fraud  
CONCEPT: fake IDs  
CONCEPT: arson@N  
CONCEPT: robbery@N  
CONCEPT: burglary@N  
  
CONCEPT: this killer  
CLASSIFIER: gunman  
CLASSIFIER: gunmen  
CLASSIFIER: narcotic  
CLASSIFIER: narcotics  
CONCEPT: drug addiction  
CONCEPT: drug addict@N  
CONCEPT: addiction to drugs  
CONCEPT: addictions to drugs  
CONCEPT: drug problem@N  
CONCEPT: drug abuse  
CONCEPT: substance abuse  
CONCEPT: drug use  
CONCEPT: drug habit@N  
CONCEPT: drug offender@N  
  
CLASSIFIER: pseudoephedrine  
CLASSIFIER: heroin  
CLASSIFIER: cocaine  
  
CONCEPT: flow of drugs  
CONCEPT: drug bust@N  
CONCEPT: culture of drugs  
CONCEPT: culture of violence  
  
  
CONCEPT: minor violation@N  
CONCEPT: gambling  
CONCEPT: slot machines  
  
#Adj  
CLASSIFIER: violent  
  
#CLASSIFIER: illegal  
CLASSIFIER: drunken driving  
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CLASSIFIER: driving drunk  
  
  
##phrases  
CONCEPT_RULE: (SENT, "_c{parole}", 
(OR, "violation", "violate@"))  
CONCEPT_RULE: (SENT, "_c{drive@}", 
(OR, "drunk", "intoxicated", "inebriated", 
"drugs", "texting"))  
CONCEPT_RULE: (SENT, "_c{run@}", 
(OR, "light@N", "stoplight@N", "red 
light@N"))  
  
CONCEPT_RULE: (DIST_8, "_c{drugs}", 
(OR, "push@", "deal@", "dealer@"))  
CONCEPT_RULE: (DIST_8, 
"_c{drug@N}", (OR, "illegal"))  
CONCEPT_RULE: (SENT, 
"_c{abuse@}", (OR, "seniors", 
"elder@N"))  
CONCEPT_RULE: (DIST_8, "_c{drug 
test@N}", (OR, "fail@", (DIST_4, "not", 
"pass@")))  
 
Tough Rules 
Tough Words:  Tough On:  
REMOVE_ITEM: (ALIGNED, 
"_c{ToughWds}", "DisambigSoft") 
#CONCEPT_RULE: (UNLESS, 
"AlienWds", (SENT, (DIST_8, 
"_c{ToughWds}", "CrimeWds"))) 
REMOVE_ITEM: (ALIGNED, 
"_c{ToughWds}", "SoftOn") 
CONCEPT_RULE: (UNLESS, 
"AlienWds", (DIST_8, 
"_c{ToughWds}", "CrimeWds")) 
 
CONCEPT_RULE: (UNLESS, 
"AlienWds", (DIST_15, 
"_c{ToughWds}", "CrimeWdsFar")) 
#CONCEPT: fight@  
CONCEPT: leader in fighting 
CONCEPT_RULE: (SENT, (OR, 
"_c{death penalty@}", 
"_c{execution}", "_c{capital 
punishment}"), (OR, "subject@", 
"proponent", "violent", "violence", 
"mandatory", "face@", "support@", 
"option", "institute@V")) 
CONCEPT: leader in the fight 
CONCEPT_RULE: (UNLESS, "not", 
(DIST_8, (OR, "_c{penalty@}", 
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"_c{fines}", "_c{punishment}"), (OR, 
"increase@", "enforce@", "stiffen@", 
"toughen", "tougher"))) 
CONCEPT: take the fight to 
CONCEPT_RULE: (DIST_8, 
"law@N", (OR, "_c{teeth}", 
"_c{stronger}", "_{anemic}", 
"_c{strengthen}", "_c{enforce@}")) 
CONCEPT: committed to fighting 
CONCEPT_RULE: (SENT, (OR, 
"_c{mandatory}", "_c{mandate@}", 
"_c{double}", "_c{lengthen}", 
"_c{toughen}"), (OR, "jail", "prison", 
"sentencing", "sentence@N", 
"penalty@")) 
CONCEPT: aggressive in fighting CONCEPT: strong death penalty law 
CONCEPT: aggressively fight@ 
CONCEPT_RULE: (SENT, (OR, 
"_c{child abuse}", "_c{abuse and 
neglect}", "_c{abuse and exploitation}", 
"_c{abused and neglected}", (DIST_6, 
"_c{abuse}", "neglect")), (OR, "held 
accountable", "too many incidents", 
"protect@", "shield@")) 
CONCEPT: fought the scourge CONCEPT: sexual predator@N 
CONCEPT: fought it back CONCEPT: sexually _w predator 
CONCEPT: measures to fight CONCEPT: sex offender@N 
CONCEPT: ramp up our fight CONCEPT: consumer protection@ 
CONCEPT: striking back against CONCEPT: predatory lender@ 
CONCEPT: we went after CONCEPT: tough law@ 
CONCEPT: too many incidents CONCEPT: tougher law@ 
 CONCEPT: lawlessness and corruption 
#CONCEPT: combat@ CONCEPT: abetted by 
 
CONCEPT: rampant violation of the 
law 
CONCEPT: crack down CONCEPT: ensuring the safety 
CONCEPT: cracked down 
CONCEPT: safety and security of our 
citizens 
CONCEPT: cracking down CONCEPT: obtain DNA samples 
CONCEPT: cracks down CONCEPT: require DNA samples 
CONCEPT: prosecute@ CONCEPT: sumbit DNA samples 
CONCEPT: fullest extent CONCEPT: DNA samples immediately 
CONCEPT: put an end to CONCEPT: obtain DNA samples 
CONCEPT: work with me to stop CONCEPT: strengthen our security 
CONCEPT: failure to address 
CONCEPT_RULE: (SENT, (OR, 
"_c{assault weapon@}", "_c{military-
grade weapon@}"), (OR, "ban@", 
"prohibit@", "no place in our state")) 
CONCEPT: close the loophole@ CONCEPT: threats to our security 
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 CONCEPT: acts of aggression 
#Release CONCEPT: act of aggression 
CONCEPT: prevent the release CONCEPT: homeland security 
CONCEPT: preventing the release CONCEPT: bomb threat@N 
CONCEPT: release@V _w early CONCEPT: bomb@V 
CONCEPT: release@V _w dangerous 
criminal@N CONCEPT: bombing@N 
CONCEPT: prior to release CONCEPT: anthrax threat@N 
CONCEPT: before we release CONCEPT: chemical weapon@N 
CONCEPT: awaiting release CONCEPT: biological weapon@N 
 CONCEPT: terrorist act@N 
##Keep this one only with Remove item 
rule above CONCEPT: terrorist action@N 
CONCEPT: arrest@ CONCEPT: bio-terror 
 CONCEPT: bio-terrorism 
CONCEPT: lock up CONCEPT: false terrorist threat@N 
CONCEPT: locking up CONCEPT: terrorism 
CONCEPT: prosecute@ CONCEPT: terrorist@ 
CONCEPT: pass a law CONCEPT: terroristic 
 CONCEPT: terror tactics 
CONCEPT: new legislation CONCEPT: terrorism-related 
CONCEPT: propose legislation CONCEPT: war on terror 
CONCEPT: proposes legislation CONCEPT: war against terror 
CONCEPT: proposing legislation 
CONCEPT: defiance of tyranny and 
terror 
CONCEPT: new law@N CONCEPT: threats of terror 
CONCEPT_RULE: (DIST_6, (OR, 
"loophole@", "deficiency@", "reform@", 
"enact@", "re-write"), (OR, "_c{law@}", 
"_c{legislation}", "_c{statutes}")) CONCEPT: threat of terror 
CONCEPT: new bill CONCEPT: enemies of freedom 
CONCEPT: new penalties CONCEPT: war against freedom 
CONCEPT: throw the book at CONCEPT: weapon of choice is fear 
CONCEPT: punish@ CONCEPT: face of terror 
CONCEPT: punishment CONCEPT: stand against terror 
CONCEPT: severe consequences CONCEPT: fight against terror 
CLASSIFIER: thugs CONCEPT: global threat@N 
CONCEPT: cowardly CONCEPT: freedom from terror 
CONCEPT: cowards CONCEPT: protection from terror 
CONCEPT: incarcerate@ CONCEPT: terror alert@N 
CONCEPT: license revocation CONCEPT: fight terror 
CONCEPT: lose their license CONCEPT: fighting terror 
CONCEPT_RULE: (SENT, (OR, 
"_c{lose@}", "_c{revoke@}", 
"_c{suspend@}"), "license") CONCEPT: fought terror 
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 CONCEPT: terror alert@ 
CONCEPT: background check@  
CONCEPT: lifetime supervision  
CONCEPT: against a child  
CONCEPT: against children  
CLASSIFIER: revolving door  
CONCEPT: abolished parole  
CONCEPT: abolish parole  
CONCEPT: abolishing parole  
CONCEPT: abolishes parole  
CLASSIFIER: uninvestigated  
CONCEPT: zero tolerance  
CONCEPT: not be tolerated  
#CONCEPT: severe  
#CONCEPT: severely  
  
CONCEPT: long past time  
CLASSIFIER: automatic  
CLASSIFIER: tough  
CLASSIFIER: tougher  
CLASSIFIER: toughest  
CONCEPT: rest of their lives  
CONCEPT: life sentence  
CONCEPT: entire sentence  
CONCEPT: should face life  
CONCEPT: full sentence  
#CONCEPT: minimum sentence  
#CONCEPT: minimum sentencing  
CONCEPT_RULE: (UNLESS, "reform", 
(SENT, (OR, "_c{minimum sentencing}", 
"_c{minimum sentence@N}")))  
CONCEPT: 100% of their sentence  
CONCEPT_RULE: (DIST_6, 
"_c{serve@}", "sentence")  
CONCEPT_RULE: (DIST_6, 
"_c{close@}", "loophole@N")  
CONCEPT: justice for victims  
CONCEPT: behind bars  
CONCEPT: off the streets  
CONCEPT: no sympathy  
CONCEPT: no regrets  
CONCEPT: bad for our families  
CONCEPT: biggest hustle  
CONCEPT: child predators  
CONCEPT: chronic  
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CONCEPT: bad people  
CONCEPT: eliminate parole  
CONCEPT: eliminating parole  
CONCEPT: eliminated parole  
CONCEPT: eliminates parole  
CONCEPT: without parole  
CONCEPT: out of circulation  
CONCEPT: vigorous enforcement  
CONCEPT: enforce@  
CONCEPT: drug enforcement  
CONCEPT: held without bail  
CONCEPT: swiftly jail  
CONCEPT: repeat offender@N  
CONCEPT: habitual offender@N  
CONCEPT: get off light  
CONCEPT: get off lightly  
CONCEPT: got off light  
CONCEPT: got off lightly  
CONCEPT: conviction rate  
CONCEPT: real punishment  
CONCEPT: clear message  
CONCEPT: strongest possible message  
CONCEPT_RULE: (DIST_4, (OR, 
"_c{legislation}", "_c{law@N}"), (OR, 
"protect@", "safety", "safe"))  
CONCEPT: before they have _w chance to  
CONCEPT: make it a felony  
CONCEPT: will find you  
CONCEPT: track down  
CONCEPT: tracking down  
CONCEPT: tracked down  
CONCEPT: frivolous appeals  
CONCEPT: statute of limitations  
CONCEPT: gun reform  
  
#CLASSIFIER: prison  
#CLASSIFIER: jail  
CONCEPT: putting _w in prison  
CONCEPT: putting _w in jail  
CONCEPT: from prison early  
CONCEPT: from jail early  
CONCEPT: keep you in jail  
CONCEPT: keep you in prison  
CONCEPT: will lock you up  
CONCEPT: serious prison time  
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CONCEPT: serious jail time  
CONCEPT: instead of going to jail  
CONCEPT: instead of going to prison  
CONCEPT: automatic jail  
CONCEPT: automatic prison  
CONCEPT: minimum jail  
CONCEPT: minimum prison  
CONCEPT: prison for at least  
CONCEPT: jail for at least  
CONCEPT: life in jail  
CONCEPT: life in prison  
CONCEPT: mandatory prison  
CONCEPT: mandatory jail  
CONCEPT: deserve to be in jail  
CONCEPT: deserve to be in prison  
CONCEPT: deserves to be in jail  
CONCEPT: deserves to be in prison  
CONCEPT: swiftly jail@  
CONCEPT: belong in prison  
CONCEPT: belong in jail  
CONCEPT: where they belong  
CONCEPT: stay in prison  
CONCEPT: stay in jail  
CONCEPT: they can't hurt  
CONCEPT: no further harm  
CONCEPT: tragic  
CONCEPT: tragedy  
 
Soft Rules 
Soft Words:  Soft On:  
REMOVE_ITEM: (ALIGNED, 
"_c{SoftWds}", "DisambigTough") 
#CONCEPT_RULE: (UNLESS, 
"AlienWds", (SENT, (DIST_8, 
"_c{SoftWds}", "CrimeWds"))) 
 
CONCEPT_RULE: (UNLESS, 
"AlienWds", (SENT, (DIST_8, 
"_c{SoftWds}", "CrimeWds"))) 
CONCEPT: justice reforms 
CONCEPT_RULE: (UNLESS, 
"AlienWds", (SENT, (DIST_8, 
"_c{SoftWds}", "CrimeWdsFar"))) 
CONCEPT: prison reform@N  
CONCEPT: criminal justice resources 
CONCEPT_RULE: (SENT, (OR, 
"_c{child abuse}", "_c{abuse and 
neglect}", "_c{abuse and exploitation}", 
"_c{abused and neglected}", (DIST_6, 
LaChapelle 63 
 
"_c{abuse}", "neglect")), (OR, "small 
investment", "ways to reduce", 
"stem@", "prevent@", "address@", 
"services")) 
CONCEPT: criminal justice personnel 
CONCEPT_RULE: (SENT, "repeal@", 
"_c{background check@}") 
#CONCEPT: crime lab@N 
CONCEPT: local communities join 
forces 
CONCEPT: investigate@ 
CONCEPT_RULE: (SENT, "_c{shared 
service}", "police") 
CONCEPT: investigation@ 
CONCEPT_RULE: (SENT, 
"_c{partnership}", (OR, "police", 
"troopers", "law enforcement")) 
CONCEPT: did not commit 
CONCEPT_RULE: (SENT, (OR, 
"_c{work together}"), "police and 
communities") 
CONCEPT: exonerate@  
CONCEPT: exoneration@ CONCEPT: drug court@N 
CLASSIFIER: technology CONCEPT: reform the justice system 
 CONCEPT: reform _w drug policy@N 
 CONCEPT: drug reform 
CONCEPT: high-tech tools CONCEPT: drug policy reform 
CONCEPT: solve@ CONCEPT: drug policy 
#CONCEPT: address@V CONCEPT: smart on crime 
CONCEPT: tackle@V CONCEPT: criminal justice resources 
#CONCEPT: end@V CONCEPT: criminal justice personnel 
CONCEPT: provide a safe haven CONCEPT: backlog of criminal cases 
CONCEPT: safe haven from abuse  
CONCEPT: provided safe haven CONCEPT: free legal services 
CONCEPT: safe haven for survivors  
CONCEPT: somewhere safe CONCEPT: community sentencing 
 CONCEPT: release and re-integration 
CLASSIFIER: overcrowded CONCEPT: less time in jail 
#CONCEPT: build more prisons CONCEPT: less time in prison 
CONCEPT: prisoner@N CONCEPT: prevent incarceration 
CLASSIFIER: supervision 
CONCEPT: indiscriminate prison 
sentences 
CONCEPT: full restitution CLASSIFIER: correctional 
CONCEPT: prison is not  
CONCEPT: prison space CONCEPT: drug rehabilitation 
CONCEPT: prison beds CONCEPT: drug treatment 
CONCEPT: jail crowding CONCEPT: reclaiming lives 
 CONCEPT: reclaiming a life 
#CONCEPT: release@ CONCEPT: rehabilitative services 
CONCEPT: collaborative releae effort@N CONCEPT: struggle with addiction 
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CONCEPT: discretion to release  
CONCEPT: supervised release CONCEPT: crime prevention 
 CONCEPT: recidivism 
CLASSIFIER: probation  
CLASSIFIER: offender accountability CONCEPT: mere possession 
CONCEPT: incarceration CONCEPT: merely arrested 
 CONCEPT: wrongful convictions 
CONCEPT: rehabilitation CLASSIFIER: minor violations 
CONCEPT: rehabilitate@V CONCEPT: non-violent 
CLASSIFIER: services CONCEPT: nonviolent 
CONCEPT: mental health services  
CONCEPT: mental-health services 
CONCEPT: second amendment 
right@N 
#CONCEPT: help@  
CONCEPT: from returning to prison 
CONCEPT_RULE: (SENT, "offender", 
(OR, "_c{treatment}", "_c{re-entry}", 
"_c{supervision}", "_c{addiction}", 
"_c{addict@N}")) 
CONCEPT: stay out of jail 
CONCEPT_RULE: (SENT, (OR, 
"release@", "discretion"), (OR, 
"_c{non-violent}", "_c{nonviolent}")) 
CONCEPT: treatment 
CONCEPT_RULE: (SENT, (OR, 
"_c{death penalty@}", 
"_c{execution}"), (OR, "institute@V", 
"ban@", "repeal@", "eliminate@", 
"recommendation@", "abolish@", 
"expensive", "ineffective", "opposed")) 
CONCEPT: teach@ 
CONCEPT_RULE: (SENT, (OR, 
"_c{partnership}", "_{working 
together}"), (OR, "police", "law 
enforcement")) 
CONCEPT: educate@  
CONCEPT: education  
CONCEPT: make the transition  
  
CONCEPT: conference@N  
CONCEPT: resources  
CONCEPT: costs  
CLASSIFIER: funding  
CLASSIFIER: expensive  
CONCEPT: fiscal  
CONCEPT: per day  
CONCEPT: prison spending  
CONCEPT: prison costs  
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CONCEPT: deter@  
CONCEPT: prevent@  
CLASSIFIER: prevention  
#CLASSIFIER: possible  
CLASSIFIER: reducing  
CLASSIFIER: reduction  
CLASSIFIER: lowering  
CONCEPT: all-time low  
CONCEPT: all time low  
CONCEPT: was down  
CONCEPT: is down  
CLASSIFIER: rate  
  
CONCEPT: drug and alcohol  
CONCEPT: drugs and alcohol  
CLASSIFIER: addiction  
CONCEPT: addict@N  
CONCEPT: safe harbor  
  
CLASSIFIER: scripture  
CONCEPT: compassion  
#CONCEPT: common sense  
CONCEPT: have to balance  
CONCEPT: second chance  
CONCEPT: first-time  
CONCEPT: first time  
  
CONCEPT: technical violator@N  
C_CONCEPT: being _c{arrested}  
C_CONCEPT: merely _c{arrested}  
C_CONCEPT: be _c{arrested}  
  
CONCEPT: victim@ advocate@  
CONCEPT: correction system  
 
Additional Rules 
Other Terms 
AlienWords 
##Only Classifier or Regex rules; due to use with UNLESS 
CLASSIFIER: alien 
CLASSIFIER: aliens 
CLASSIFIER: immigration 
CLASSIFIER: border 
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CLASSIFIER: borders 
CLASSIFIER: deportation 
CLASSIFIER: deport 
CLASSIFIER: deports 
CLASSIFIER: deporting 
CLASSIFIER: deported 
 
 
DisambigSoft 
##These are phrases that Tough will pick up incorrectly without a Remove Item rule 
C_CONCEPT: being _c{arrested} 
C_CONCEPT: merely _c{arrested} 
C_CONCEPT: be _c{arrested} 
C_CONCEPT: not only tough 
 
 
DisambigTough 
##These are phrases that Soft will pick up incorrectly without a Remove Item rule 
C_CONCEPT: _c{prevent} and prosecute 
C_CONCEPT: cannot _c{prevent} 
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Appendix C- Variable Descriptions 
 
Variable  How it is measured Source 
Jurisdiction Count The total number of 
inmates under the 
jurisdiction of a state’s 
corrections system 
Bureau of Justice Statistics- 
Corrections Statistical Analysis 
Tool (Prisoners) 
Jurisdiction Rate The number of inmates 
under the jurisdiction of a 
state’s corrections system 
per 100,000 state residents. 
Bureau of Justice Statistics- 
Corrections Statistical Analysis 
Tool (Prisoners) 
Custody Count The total number of 
inmates in the custody of a 
state’s corrections system 
Bureau of Justice Statistics- 
Corrections Statistical Analysis 
Tool (Prisoners) 
Custody Rate The number of inmates 
under the custody of a 
state’s corrections system 
per 100,000 state residents. 
Bureau of Justice Statistics- 
Corrections Statistical Analysis 
Tool (Prisoners) 
Jurisdiction Count 
Change 
The percent change in 
jurisdiction count. 
Calculated by the 
jurisdiction count this year 
minus jurisdiction count 
last year divided by 
jurisdiction count last year.  
Jurisdiction Count variable 
Jurisdiction Rate 
Change 
The percent change in 
jurisdiction rate. Calculated 
by the jurisdiction rate this 
year minus jurisdiction rate 
last year divided by 
jurisdiction rate last year. 
Jurisdiction Rate variable 
Custody Count 
Change 
The percent change in 
custody count. Calculated 
by the custody count this 
year minus custody count 
last year divided by 
custody count last year. 
Custody Count variable 
Custody Rate 
Change 
The percent change in 
custody rate. Calculated by 
the custody rate this year 
minus custody rate last 
year divided by custody 
rate last year. 
Custody Rate variable 
Tough Proportion Number of paragraphs with 
tough on crime rhetoric 
Text analysis model 
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divided by the total number 
of paragraphs in a speech 
Soft Proportion Number of paragraphs with 
soft on crime rhetoric 
divided by the total number 
of paragraphs in a speech 
Text analysis model 
Governor’s PID Coding of the governor of 
each speech as 
republican=1, 
independent=0, or 
democratic=-1 
Speeches 
South Coding of each state as 
south=1 or non-south=0 
State regions 
Percent Black The number of Black 
citizens in a state divided 
by the population 
Statistical Abstract of the US, 
table 19 (2011) & table 20 
(2013) 
Percent Black 
Centered 
The percent of Black 
citizens in a state with the 
mean of 10.65 removed 
Percent Black variable 
Black & South 
Interaction 
Percent Black variable 
multiplied by the South 
variable. 
Percent Black variable and South 
variable 
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Appendix D- Aggressiveness Rankings 
 
Match String Aggressiveness 1-5, 5=most tough 
Fines 1 
Closed 1 
Double 1 
we went after 1 
uninvestigated 1 
Close 1 
bad people 1 
Instead of going to jail 1 
Arrested 2 
Incarcerated 2 
background checks 2 
Incarcerate 2 
Strengthen 2 
Arrest 2 
proposing legislation 2 
ensuring the safety 2 
Tragic 2 
pass a law 2 
Incarcerating 2 
bio-terrorism 2 
safety and security of our citizens 2 
Stronger 2 
strengthen our security 2 
statute of limitations 2 
leader in the fight 2 
too many incidents 2 
Tragedy 2 
Serve 2 
work with me to stop 2 
Arrests 2 
false terrorist threats 2 
Served 2 
propose legislation 2 
bio-terror 2 
war against freedom 2 
protection from terror 2 
awaiting release 2 
gun reform 2 
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lifetime supervision 2 
bad for our families 2 
abetted by 2 
License Revocation 2 
background check 2 
failure to address 2 
leader in fighting 2 
global threat 2 
global threats 2 
Homeland Security 3 
enemies of freedom 3 
defiance of tyranny and terror 3 
clear message 3 
Prosecute 3 
Teeth 3 
Abuse 3 
Legislation 3 
Mandatory 3 
Enforce 3 
Mandated 3 
Laws 3 
new penalties 3 
Penalties 3 
consumer protection 3 
drug enforcement 3 
freedom from terror 3 
Enforcing 3 
Law 3 
obtain DNA samples 3 
Enforced 3 
act of aggression 3 
Prosecuted 3 
acts of aggression 3 
measures to fight 3 
Prosecuting 3 
Penalty 3 
Revoke 3 
consumer protections 3 
predatory lenders 3 
fought the scourge 3 
no regrets 3 
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new law 3 
mandates 3 
frivolous appeals 3 
new laws 3 
put an end to 3 
held without bail 3 
mandating 3 
new legislation 3 
stand against terror 3 
weapon of choice is fear 3 
terrorism-related 3 
lose their license 3 
lose 3 
lawlessness and corruption 3 
rampant violation of the law 3 
committed to fighting 3 
require DNA samples 3 
DNA samples immediately 3 
face of terror 3 
terrorist 4 
terrorism 4 
punishment 4 
terrorist acts 4 
war on terror 4 
terrorists 4 
tougher laws 4 
tougher 4 
cracking down 4 
crack down 4 
tough 4 
war against terror 4 
abuse and neglect 4 
serious prison time 4 
toughen 4 
make it a felony 4 
tough law 4 
threats to our security 4 
not be tolerated 4 
revolving door 4 
off the streets 4 
bomb 4 
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bomb threats 4 
behind bars 4 
assault weapon 4 
assault weapons 4 
toughest 4 
lengthen 4 
tough laws 4 
punish 4 
punished 4 
from prison early 4 
cracked down 4 
bombs 4 
they can't hurt 4 
bombing 4 
terrorist actions 4 
abuse and exploitation 4 
tougher law 4 
repeat offenders 4 
Habitual Offender 4 
minimum sentencing 4 
minimum sentences 4 
bombings 4 
where they belong 4 
abused and neglected 4 
cracks down 4 
punishing 4 
mandatory prison 4 
no sympathy 4 
life sentence 4 
minimum sentence 4 
track down 4 
fight terror 4 
repeat offender 4 
before we release 4 
swiftly jail 4 
throw the book at 4 
release potentially dangerous 
criminals 4 
life in prison 4 
got off light 4 
habitual offenders 4 
LaChapelle 73 
 
real punishment 4 
threat of terror 4 
biological weapons 4 
threats of terror 4 
fight against terror 4 
aggressively fight 4 
lock up 4 
chronic 4 
minimum jail 4 
punishes 4 
aggressive in fighting 4 
release criminals early 4 
statutes 4 
automatic jail 4 
automatic 4 
thugs 4 
terror tactics 4 
without parole 4 
strongest possible message 4 
prison for at least 4 
terror alerts 4 
belong in jail 4 
ramp up our fight 4 
prevent the release 4 
long past time 4 
will find you 4 
entire sentence 4 
terroristic 4 
chemical weapons 4 
sexual predators 5 
sexual predator 5 
sex offenders 5 
death penalty 5 
sex offender 5 
cowards 5 
rest of their lives 5 
eliminating parole 5 
ZERO tolerance 5 
deserve to be in jail 5 
against children 5 
child abuse 5 
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child predators 5 
vigorous enforcement 5 
capital punishment 5 
close the loopholes 5 
abolished parole 5 
strong death penalty law 5 
keep you in jail 5 
will lock you up 5 
putting criminals in prison 5 
Anthrax threats 5 
sexually violent predator 5 
execution 5 
before they have a chance to 5 
cowardly 5 
 
